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RECENT CASES
respect to membership.17 When the by-laws set up an essential re-
quirement of membership, in accordance with the charter. or en-
abling act, applicants have no right to membership unless the by-
laws requirement has been fulfilled or has been declared invalid. 8
It is submitted' that the court in the instant case should have
reached an opposite result. A court should not compel a coropra-
tion to admit an applicant to membership against the will of those
whose consent is essential." Further, the court should not ordinar-
ily substitute its judgment for the judgment of those who are au-
thorized to adopt the corporate by-laws.2°
ARMOND G. ERICKSON.
CRIMINAL LAW- LIMITATIONS OF PROSECUTIONS- LIMITATIONS
APPLICABLE. - Defendant was convicted of second degree murder
under an indictment charging him with first degree murder. The
trial court, holding that the statute of limitations applied to second
degree murder, arrested judgment before sentence. The statute
provided that "no person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for
any offense not punishable with death unless the indictment there-
for shall be found within five years from the time of committing the
offense .... I On appeal the Supreme Court held, that murder was
one offense under common law, and still remains so; the statute
merely divided murder into degrees for the purpose of punish-
ment.' Therefore, the offense charged in the indictment is "punish-
able with death," and excluded from the operation of the statute.
State v. Brown, 22 N.J. 405, 126 A.2d 161 (1956).
The New Jersey decision is contrary to the overwhelming weight
of authority which holds that one cannot be convicted of a lesser
offense includible within a larger crime, where prosecution for the
17. S. Dak. Code § 11-2209 (Supp. 1953) ("Any patron of the Co-operative
may become a member . . . the by-laws may prescribe additional qualifications and
limitations in repect to membership.").
18. Meyers v. Lux, 75 N.W.2d 533, 538 (S. D. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
19. Sorrick v. The Consolidated Tel. Co. of Springfort, 340 Mich. 463, 65 N.W.2d
713" (1954); Mills v. Friedman, 111 Misc. 253, 181 N.Y.S. 285, 294 (Sup. Ct. 1920)
(dictum).
20. See note 1 supra.
1. N. J. Rev. Stat. § 2:183-2 (1937) (Effective June 30, 1953, the period 'of
limitation was extended to *five years, L. 1953, c. 204).
2. N. J. Rev. Stat. § 2:138-2 (1937) ("Murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilfull, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing, or which shall be committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpe-
trate arson, burglary, rape, robbery, or kodomy, shall be* murder in the first degree; and
all other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree; and the jury before whom
any person indicted for murder shall be tried shall, if they find such person guilty thereof,
designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second
degree.").
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larger crime is commenced after the expiration of the limitations
applicable to the lesser offense.3 To hold otherwise would allow the
state to proceed with a prosecution by some method which would
deprive the accused of the benefit of the statute of limitations,
while other persons guilty.of the like offense may have the benefit
of such statute because the state chose to proceed with the prosecu-
tion by a different method.4 Such a procedure would, in effect,
nullify the statute.5
Florida is the only other state which has been found to have a
statute similar to that of New Jersey, 6 but they reach a result in
accord with the majority view. In cases with facts substantially the
same as those in the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court held,
that where the statute of limitations had run on all lesser crimes,
defendant could not be convicted of anything but the crime in the
indictment which was excluded from the running of the statute.
7
One of these cases also held that to permit a conviction for the
lesser offense was a denial of defendant's right of due process of
law." The Federal Government has a statute similar to New Jersey
and Florida but no cases in point have been found.9
Georgia is the only other jurisdiction that supports the holding in
the instant case. The Supreme Court there held that the statute of
limitations applicable in a criminal case is that which relates to the
offense charged in the indictment, and not to any minor offense in-
cluded therein."0
The common law rule was that there was no limitation of time
within which offenses might.be prosecuted." Statutes of limitations
3. Spears v. State, 26 Ala. App. 376, 160 So. 727 (1935); People v. Angelo, 24
Cal. App.2d 626, 75 P.2d 614 (1938); Mitchell v. State, 157. Fla. 121, 25 So.2d 73
(1946); People v. Di Pasquale, 161 App. Div. 196, 146 N.Y.S. 523 (3rd Dep't. 1914);
McKinney v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 342, 257 S.W. 258 (1923).
4. Mitchell v. State, 157 Fla. 121, 25 So.2d 73 (1946); State v. King, 84 S.E.2d
313, (W. Va. 1954) (".. ..f defendant had in the first instance been indicted -or
assault and battery . . . the defendant's conviction, being for a misdemeanor, would have
been void . . . and we are of the opinion, that, notwithstanding in the case at bar the
defendant was indicted for a felony, his conviction for assault and battery is barred by the
limitation statute.'")
5. People v. Picetti, 124 Cal. 361, 57 Pac. 156 (1899); Drott v. People, 71 Colo.
383, 206 Pac.797 (1922) (Defendant was indicted for grand larceny, an offense "not
barred by the statute of limitations, and convicted of petit larceny, which was barred.
The Supreme Court dismissed the defendant, stating that "to prevent the operation of
the bar by charging a crime of a higher grade not within the bar would nullify the
statute." )
6. Fla. Stat. § 923.05 (1941).
7. Mitchell v. State, 157 Fla. 121, 25 So.2d 73 (1946); Perry v. State, 103 Fla.
580, 137 So. 798 (1931); Blackmon v. State, 88 Fla. 188, 101 So. 319 (1924); Nelson
v. State, 17 Fla. 195 (1879).
8. Mitchell v. State, 157 Fla. 121, 25 So.2d 73 (1946).
9. 62 Stat. 828 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. 3282 as amended 68 Stat. 1145 (1954).
10. Sikes v. State, 20 Ga. App. 80, 92 S.E. 553 (1917); Troup v. State, 17 Ga. App.
387, 87 S.E. 157 (1915); Reynolds v. State, 1 Ga. 222, 227 (1846) (dictum).
11. United States v. Fraiden, 63 F.Supp. 271 (D.Md. 1945); Buch v. International
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have been adopted upon the theory that prosecutions should not
be allowed to ferment endlessly in files of the government to ex-
plode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection
of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed, beyond avail-
ability.12
The decision in the instant case rests upon the interpretation of a
criminal statute, and the rules of statutory construction should-be
followed. The New Jersey Supreme Court has come to a conclusion
that is contra to the weight of authority and the better legal reason-
ing. The better view is that statutes of limitations in criminal cases
must be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, 3 and against
the state.14 Had the legislature intended to exclude second degree
murder from the statute of limitations they would have so provided.
The court was not justified in implying the legislature's intent.
RICHARD A. RAHLFS.
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIONS AGAINST INTEREST - IMPLICATING CON-
FESSION OF ONE CO-CONSPRIATOR IN A JOINT TRIAL. - The United
States District Court in a joint trial convicted petitioner and four
co-defendants of violating a federal statute by conspiring to deal
unlawfully in alcohol.1 At the close of the prosecution's case the
trial court admitted the confession of a co-defendant, made after
the termination of the alleged conspiracy and without deleting ref-
erences to the petitioner.2 The jury was instructed to consider the
confession only in determining the guilt of the confessor. The peti-
tioner did not request a separate trial but moved to exclude the co-
defendant's confession contending it was prejudicial error against
him. The United States Supreme Court, four Justices dissenting,
held that a restricted admission of a post conspiracy confession by
one co-conspirator which implicated petitioner did not constitute
reversible error. Paoli v. United States, 77 S.Ct. 294 (1957).
The decision in the instant case is supported by the weight of
Alliance of Theater State Employees and Moving Picture Mach. Operators of U. S. and
Canada, 55 Cal. App.2d 357, 130 P.2d 788 (1942).
12. United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777 (D. N.J. 1942).
13. State v. Colvin, 284 Mo. 195, 223 S.W. 585 (1920); Jacox v. State, 154 Neb.
416, 48 N.W.2d 390 (1951); State v. Patriarca, 71 R. I. 151, 43 A.2d 54 (1945).
14. State v. Brenner, 132 N.J.L. 607, 41 A.2d 532 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945); State
v. Patriarca, 71 R.I. 151, 43 A.2d 54 (1945).
1. 62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 1 371 (1952).
2. Once the conspiracy is over the acts or confessions of a conspirator are ad-
missable only against the confessor and are inadmissable hearsay as to the other de-
fendants. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440 (1949); Fiswick v. United States,
329 U. S. 211 (1946); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1891).
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